Culturalist explanations are often used to account for the success of far-right parties, leading to an overemphasis on migration policies. But these explanations often overlook the important role social insecurity plays in triggering support among the large, peripheral far-right electorates. Social policies can offer effective solutions by deterring these groups from voting for the far-right.

 

 

The electoral performance of far-right parties is on an upward trend. A series of local, national and European-level elections have been increasingly contested on nationalist issues, with far-right parties making significant gains: the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in regions such as Thuringia and Saxony in September 2024; the Rassemblement National (RN) in France’s snap parliamentary election a couple of months earlier; and the June 2024 European Parliament (EP) elections which witnessed the rise of the far-right across many-if not most-member states. Examples don’t end here: in late 2023 Geert Wilders anti-Muslim far right Party for Freedom (PVV) won the Dutch parliamentary election. The Sweden Democrats (SD), the Danish People’s Party (DF), the Spanish Vox and the Portuguese Chega have also all been garnering substantial popular support. This phenomenon extends well beyond Europe, with the far-right making gains in countries such as El Salvador, Chile, Argentina and India. In the US, Trump has won the elections, indicating widespread support for far-right positions.   

 

Many of these parties have held in the past - or continue to hold- government positions. This emboldens them and makes them increasingly politically relevant, as they can implement policy and influence the programmatic agenda of other parties. Systemic entrenchment leads to the normalisation of extreme ideas and has a spill over effect to the mainstream right. Examples abound, from the British Conservatives’ taking up the Brexit narrative in the UK and later their obsession with sending migrants to Rwanda, the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) enabling Wilders in the Netherlands and the Greek New Democracy (ND) propagating some hard-core nationalist ideals. This normalisation often extends to coverage in the media giving far-right populist ideas widespread exposure.

 

In sum, the success of far-right parties and groups that compete along ‘new nationalism’ issues has three features: (1) increase in votes cast; (2) joining governments and making policy; and (3) normalisation and the ability to drive party competition. This has significant implications for democracy: systemic entrenchment can lead to the normalisation of hate and extreme ideas, far-right populists feed off political polarisation which heighten divisive dynamics in society, and they also often compromise liberal democratic institutions once in power.

 

 

The 'welfarist turn' in far-right party positions and voters

 

Because far-right party success largely depends on mobilizing grievances over immigration, analysts and pundits alike often point to ‘cultural’ solutions: reduce immigration, propose policies that defend the national culture and mobilise around nationalist cleavages.

 

However, I argue, these solutions are at best incomplete. First, immigration is not exclusively a cultural issue. Competition with immigrants is also shaped by material interests as voters may view immigrants as competitors in the labour market, or for welfare and scarce state resources. Second, there are also a range of socio-economic and institutional grievances that may drive voters to support the far-right. Indeed, far- right parties have been effective in mobilising support among insecure populations by proposing solutions that are distinct from their older market liberal stances. This ‘welfarist turn’ in far-right party positions makes these parties appear credible to deal with rising unemployment and economic hardship.

 

The drivers of far-right party support, therefore, extend well beyond immigration. To fully grasp them, and understand where the far-right mobilizational potential lies, it is important to focus on the heterogeneity of the far-right electorate. On the one hand, core far-right voters, or ‘culturalists’, are ideological. These are voters mostly driven by ethno-cultural nationalism. They are more likely to be primarily concerned with the cultural threat posed by immigration and the extent to which immigrants (or national outsiders) may erode the national culture and national way of life. While these core voters constitute the prime far right party constituency, they only make up a small share of the far- right electorates in most European countries.

 

Peripheral voters, on the other hand, are opportunistic rather than ideological. They are mostly motivated by protest considerations, or discontent, and a range of concerns including economic and labour market insecurity, societal decline, lack of access to welfare and state resources and distrust in institutions. These voters are less loyal to the far-right but constitute a much larger proportion of its electorate.

 

In my research, I have identified a range of peripheral far-right voter groups in Europe. The list is not exhaustive, but indicatively it includes:

• The ‘materialists’, who are likely to support the prioritization of the in-group on economic grounds, but who do not necessarily identify with the other nationalist elements of far-right populist party agendas.

• The ‘welfarists’, who are exposed to high social or economic risks and are in need of welfare provision.

• The ‘decliners’ who have experienced downward class mobility and are subsequently often unable to cope with economic, social and cultural acceleration and/or feel marginalized and unfairly treated.

• The ‘distrustful’ who are discontent with the democratic process, negatively evaluate system performance and policy outputs and are likely to reward political parties that challenge the establishment and existing political norms.

• The ‘anti-environmentalists’ who reside in rural and suburban areas that are economically dependent on old industries and/or have incurred actual or perceived losses from climate change measures.

 

 

Are social policies the solution?

 

The analysis above has suggested that economic considerations and position in the labour market have an impact on voting behaviour. Many voters continue to be affected by poor labour market prospects, material deprivation and inequality. These voters tend to be highly economically insecure, as they worry about existential issues such as cuts to key services, housing, access to health provision and other social benefits. Such societal risks create favourable conditions for far-right parties, which are able to translate these risks into political advantage by presenting themselves as vocal proponents of welfare chauvinism.

 

This points to the importance of policy reforms aimed at addressing distributional conflicts and the economic insecurities and risks affecting voters. Specifically, social policies can moderate the outcomes of both objective and subjective insecurity in two ways. First, they can compensate workers once the risk has materialised, for example by providing replacement income when someone becomes unemployed. Second, they can protect workers from the risk being realised in the first place, for example by making it more difficult for employers to dismiss workers.

 

In our earlier research using the European Social Survey, we have specifically focused on six social risk groups, each understood in a loose non-exclusive sense as comprising individuals who share a characteristic that exposes them to particular risk, including: (a) the unemployed; (b) pensioners; (c) the permanently sick or disabled; (d) low-income workers; (e) workers on permanent contracts; and (f) large families. The ways in which these different social groups face distinct risks may depend on the degree to which they are compensated and/or protected by various welfare state policies in the country where they reside. The more generous the policies, the less economically insecure these groups may be; and by extension, the less likely they are to express discontent by voting for the far right.

 

Our finding that support for the far right among several 'at risk' groups is conditioned by the generosity of the policies that address their needs speaks to the debate on whether, and if so how, socio-economic risks matter for explaining voting behaviour. Welfare state policies may serve as an effective remedy for far-right party support precisely because they deter not only the most vulnerable, but a broad range of distinct social groups, thus preventing the far-right from forging voter alliances. Careful thought should, however, be given to how to balance perceived tensions between open borders and open welfare states, especially in the case of welfare states with a large in-kind and universalist component.

 

The often-suggested recommendation to focus primarily on tightening immigration won’t help because it targets the wrong type of voter: the far right ‘core’ ideological voter who is unlikely to budge. We know that political parties are more successful when they can obtain broad electoral support. This means that major electoral potential is associated with mobilisational capacity beyond a party’s core electorate. The same applies to the far-right whose mobilizational capacity largely depends on those peripheral voters who are mostly motivated by protest considerations. Instead of adopting defensive, accommodative or solely adversarial strategies that centre on immigration, therefore, we need a positive and proactive message that centres on empowerment through equality and social protection and offers mitigation and compensation to the ‘peripherals’. This will not deter everyone from voting for the far-right. But it will significantly hamper the far-right’s large mobilizational potential. 

 

 

This article is also available in German at sozialpolitikblog: "Rechtsextremismus: gibt es eine sozialpolitischen Lösung?"

Header photo by Giorgio Trovato - Unsplash